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 2 
Introduction 
 
1. This document provides an overview of how a number of national parliaments verify European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) standards, as well as the implementation of judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It is based on the premise that a priority must be placed, by 
States Parties to the ECHR, on strengthening domestic mechanisms of implementation. This is necessary in 
order to reinforce the Convention system, both by stemming the flood of applications to the Court and 
ensuring the full, rapid and effective execution of ECtHR judgments, especially those revealing systemic or 
structural problems. 
2. In cases of the non-implementation, delay or (rarely) refusal to implement a judgment, or where 
legislative reform is required, the role of parliaments is indispensable. Parliaments are uniquely well-placed 
to press executive bodies to justify their actions or inaction during the implementation process. National 
parliaments, as a branch of the state, have an obligation to ensure compliance with the Convention, 
including judgments of the ECtHR. Nevertheless, many parliaments in States Parties to the Convention 
appear not to have adequate (or any) mechanisms for fulfilling this function. Members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly appear ideally placed to fulfil the dual mandate which they possess by virtue of belonging both to 
PACE and their national parliament; for example, by promoting understanding and application of Convention 
standards at the domestic level.  
3. In response to this situation, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1823 (2011) (see Appendix) has 
called for national parliaments to create adequate procedures to verify the compatibility of draft legislation 
with ECHR standards and monitor the implementation of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments.  
4. The role of parliaments has also been recognised at the inter-governmental level, as reflected in the 
Brighton Declaration of April 2012,
1
 and the Brussels Declaration of March 2015,
2
 which urged states to 
facilitate the role of national parliaments.  
5. Accordingly, this memorandum examines:  
 The variety of existing parliamentary structures for assessing human rights compliance;  
 Reporting mechanisms that systematise dialogue between the executive and parliament;  
 Principles underpinning the role of national parliaments in the verification of Convention  standards 
and implementation of ECtHR judgments; 
 Laws on implementation, which stipulate the role of the various domestic actors involved in human 
rights implementation, including parliaments; 
 Opportunities that exist to strengthen the capacity and impact of parliamentary activity.  
 
 
1. Parliamentary structures 
 
6. The Parliamentary Assembly has recommended that: 
“National parliaments shall establish appropriate parliamentary structures to ensure rigorous and regular 
monitoring of compliance with and supervision of international human rights obligations, such as dedicated 
human rights committees or appropriate analogous structures, whose remits shall be clearly defined 
and enshrined in law” (emphasis added).
3
 
 
1.1. A specialised human rights committee 
 
7. In this model, a single standing parliamentary committee exists with a remit which is mainly or 
exclusively concerned with human rights. The committee’s remit may expressly include (or be interpreted by 
the committee to include) specific functions such as the vetting of legislation for compliance with domestic, 
regional or international commitments, and oversight of the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
                                                     
1
 On the parliamentary dimension, see High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 20 April 2012, paras 9.c.ii; 29.a.iii; and 29.e. 
2
 High-level Conference on the ‘Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared 
responsibility’, Brussels Declaration, 27 March 2015, paras B 1.b; B.2.a; B.2.f; B.2.h; and B.2.j. 
3
 PACE Resolution 1823 (2011), National parliaments: guarantors of human rights in Europe: Appendix - 
Basic principles for parliamentary supervision of international human rights standards, para 1 (reproduced in 
the Appendix to this memorandum). 
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 EXAMPLE: United Kingdom  
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) epitomises the specialised human rights committee model.
4
 
It began work in 2001 and has 12 members drawn equally from the House of Commons and House of Lords. 
The JCHR currently has two dedicated legal advisers with human rights expertise who intensively service its 
members. The Committee’s formal remit is extremely broad, covering ‘matters relating to human rights’ in the 
UK, excluding individual cases. The Committee has interpreted its mandate expansively. Among other 
activities, it:  
 selectively scrutinises government Bills (and, where possible, draft Bills) for human rights 
compatibility, and proposes amendments to Bills in order to remove any incompatibility 
identified in its reports.
5
 The JCHR’s legislative (or pre-legislative) scrutiny is assisted by a 
‘human rights memorandum’ prepared by the relevant Government department detailing the 
Bill’s compatibility with the ECHR and other international human rights obligations; 
 conducts scrutiny of the executive response to adverse ECtHR judgments, on the basis of 
criteria set out by the JCHR (e.g. a requirement that the Government should provide detailed 
plans as to its response within four months and make a final decision as to how the 
incompatibility will be remedied within six months);
6
 
 conducts thematic inquiries into issues where there is cause for concern about the UK’s 
human rights record; 
 selectively monitors the UK’s compliance with its international human rights obligations under 
UN human rights treaties, both pre- and post-ratification. 
 
 EXAMPLE: Albania  
 
In Albania, the Committee on Legal Issues, Public Administration and Human Rights (which also has a Sub-
Committee on Human Rights) within the Parliament performs a legislative vetting role; however, it has no 
specific mechanism for monitoring the execution of ECtHR judgments, which is purely an executive matter.
7
 
 
 EXAMPLE: Finland 
 
The Finnish Parliament has a Constitutional Law Committee whose principal function is to issue statements 
on bills (or other matters) sent to it for consideration regarding their constitutionality and their bearing on 
international human rights instruments, including the ECHR. Once a legislative proposal has been submitted, 
the Committee elicits the views of civil servants and external experts at a formal hearing, before adopting a 
reasoned opinion or report. If incompatibilities are identified, the Committee proposes amendments to 
eliminate the problem. Opinions of the Committee are, as a matter of constitutional custom, treated as 
formally binding on Parliament. The Committee often refers to judgments of the ECtHR.
8
 The Foreign 
Ministry sends all ECtHR decisions against Finland to the secretariat of the Committee for information; they 
are not circulated unless requested. The Parliamentary Ombudsman submits an annual report to the 
Parliament, including a short section on Finnish cases in Strasbourg, all relevant cases decided in relation to 
Finland, new cases and figures for of compensation. The report is scrutinised by the Constitutional Law 
Committee; however, the Committee has never taken a position on that section of the report. 
 
 EXAMPLE: Greece  
 
In late 2013, the Greek Parliament established a Special Permanent Committee on Monitoring the Decisions 
of the ECtHR.
9
 The Committee’s remit is to vet legislation for Convention compliance and conduct oversight 
of the execution of ECtHR judgments. The Committee had not begun its work as of October 2014, but was 
reported to be meeting regularly in the Parliament elected in January 2015. 
 
                                                     
4
 See http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/. 
5
 For the JCHR’s legislative scrutiny in the 2014-15 parliamentary session, see: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/legislative-scrutiny-
2014-15/ 
6
 From 2007 to 2010, the JCHR published annual progress reports detailing its assessment of the Government’s 
implementation of human rights judgments (both domestic and ECtHR). In the 2010-15 parliament, reports were less 
frequent. For the most recent, see JCHR, Seventh Report of Session 2014–15, Human Rights Judgments, HL Paper 
130, HC 1088 (2015), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201415/jtselect/jtrights/130/130.pdf. 
7
 Information provided at Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe capacity-building seminar on the ECHR 
(execution of judgments), Strasbourg, 4-5 September 2014. 
8
 Information provided by Kimmo Sasi, Chair of the Constitutional Law Committee (2003-11), member (2011-15). 
9
 Information provided by Voula Syrigos, Head of the Directorate for International Relations and Organisations of the 
Greek Parliament. 
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 EXAMPLE: Hungary  
Within the Hungarian National Assembly, human rights are the responsibility of the Committee on Justice, 
which has 12 members. This was formed in 2014 by a merger of two previous Committees which had existed 
since 1990: the Constitutional, Judicial and Standing Orders Committee and the Committee on Human 
Rights, Minorities, Civil and Religious Affairs (which previously had primary responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with Hungary’s international human rights obligations). The Committee on Justice receives an 
annual report by the Government Agent before the ECtHR on judgments against Hungary and the state of 
execution of judgments (see also section 2.1). 
 EXAMPLE: Latvia 
Within the Latvian Parliament, the Human Rights and Public Affairs Committee is formally responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of international human rights norms. There are no institutional arrangements 
for monitoring the implementation of ECtHR judgments. However, approximately once a year the Latvian 
Government Agent reports to the Committee about the state of execution.
10
  
 EXAMPLE: Montenegro 
Within the Parliament of Montenegro, the Committee on Human Rights and Freedoms deals with human 
rights issues. It does not have a systematic follow-up mechanism on the execution of ECtHR judgments. 
However, it has drafted an information report to the President of the Parliament on proceedings against 
Montenegro before the European Court for Human Rights with proposals for follow-up. 
 EXAMPLE: Turkey 
The Human Rights Inquiry Committee, established in 1991, handles human rights matters within the Turkish 
Parliament, relating both to domestic and international affairs.
11
 Its duties are prescribed by law.
12
 They 
include:  
 considering individual applications alleging violations of human rights; 
 examining the compatibility of national legislation and practice with international 
human rights norms; 
 scrutinising draft laws on human rights referred by the Presidency of the Parliament. 
 
The Committee may also establish sub-committees to hold thematic inquiries. Reports resulting from such 
inquiries are submitted to the Office of the Speaker and may be put on the agenda of the Plenary and/or 
referred by the Office of the Speaker to the Prime Minister or relevant ministries. As well as thematic reports, 
the Committee publishes an annual report on the matters falling within its remit. The Committee has 
dedicated legal advisers attached to it.  
In 2014, the Human Rights Inquiry Committee added to its remit the function of monitoring the 
implementation of ECtHR judgments; however, as of August 2015, this monitoring in work had not begun as 
the Committee had not yet been re-established following elections in June 2015.  
 
1.2 A specialised sub-committee with a human rights remit 
8. A variant of the specialised committee model is where a specialised sub-committee with a human 
rights remit is formed under a standing committee with a wider mandate. 
 
 EXAMPLE: Czech Republic  
The Constitutional and Legal Committee in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) of the Czech Parliament 
has established a Subcommittee on legislative initiatives of the Ombudsman and the European Court of 
Human Rights.
13
. The Ombudsman, also known as the Public Defender of Rights, mediates between 
complainants and public bodies. In addition, the Committee on Petitions has a Sub-committee on Human 
Rights.
14
. The Sub-committees are effectively working groups of their parent Committee, and meet in private. 
The Sub-committee on legislative initiatives of the Ombudsman and the ECtHR discusses the annual report 
prepared by the Government Agent on judgments against the Czech Republic and their state of execution. 
The Constitutional and Legal Committee and Committee on Petitions play the leading role in vetting the 
conformity of government and non-government bills with international human rights treaties, including the 
                                                     
10
 Information provided by Boriss Cilevics MP, Vice-Chair of the Committee on Human Rights and Public Affairs. 
11
 See http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/komisyonlar. 
12
 Law on the Committee on Human Rights Inquiry (Law no. 3686), 5 December 1990; additional duties were added to 
the Committee under Law no 6253, 1 December 2011. 
13
 See http://www.psp.cz/en/sqw/hp.sqw?k=4024. 
14
 See http://www.psp.cz/sqw/hp.sqw?k=3920. 
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ECHR.
15
 
 EXAMPLE: Ireland 
in December 2014, the Justice, Defence and Equality Committee, a joint committee of the two houses of the 
Irish Parliament), established a Sub-committee on Human Rights relative to Justice and Equality Matters.
16
 
The orders of reference of the sub-committee are to ‘examine issues, themes and proposals, legislative or 
otherwise, in regard to compliance with the human rights of persons within the State’.
17
 They do not 
expressly include monitoring the implementation of human rights judgments. 
 EXAMPLE: Poland  
In February 2014, the Justice and Human Rights Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Sejm 
(the lower house) jointly established a permanent Sub-Committee on the execution of judgments of the 
ECtHR.
18
 This followed discussions, which also involved the Committee of Human Rights, Rule of Law and 
Petitions in the Senate (the upper house), on the need to systematise arrangements for parliamentary 
oversight of the execution process.  
The new Sub-committee is composed of 11 MPs, and its terms of reference include: detailed examination of 
information submitted by the Council of Ministers on the state of execution of ECtHR judgments, and 
preparation of draft opinions for the Sejm Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.  
Representatives of the Polish Sejm and Senate are also invited to meetings of the Inter-ministerial 
Committee on the ECtHR. Representatives of the Government and the Polish Government Agent also 
participate in meetings organised by the Justice and Human Rights Committee of the Sejm and the Human 
Rights, Rule of Law and Petitions Committee of the Senate, devoted to these issues. In addition, since 2013, 
the Council of Ministers has been publishing annual reports on the state of execution of judgments by Poland 
(see section 2.1). 
 EXAMPLE: Romania 
In 2009, the Committee for Legal Matters, Discipline and Immunities (‘the Legal Committee’) in the Chamber 
of Deputies (the lower house) created a Sub-committee to monitor the execution of ECtHR judgments. The 
Sub-committee is formed of seven MPs drawn from all parliamentary groups and has dedicated legal 
advisers attached to it. Among other activities, the Sub-committee meets and corresponds with Government 
representatives on specific cases raising problems of implementation, holds public hearings and receives 
regular reports from the Office of the Government Agent.   
In view of the large number of applications and judgments against Romania, the Sub-committee has 
proposed the setting up of a joint parliamentary standing committee of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate in order to exercise stronger oversight of the Government in respect of the enforcement of judgments 
and compliance with Convention standards.
19
 
 
1.2.1 A cross-cutting or fully ‘mainstreamed’ model 
 
9. In the cross-cutting model, no single committee or sub-committee has a remit covering human rights 
matters, which are instead dealt with by different parliamentary committees as they arise within their 
respective mandates. The term ‘mainstreamed’ is also often used; this term implies that human rights 
oversight is, in practice, embedded in the work of all committees, which is not the case in all parliaments that 
have a cross-cutting committee structure. In that sense, mainstreaming may be understood in many 
parliaments as more of an aspiration than a description of actual practice.     
 EXAMPLE: Denmark 
In the Danish Parliament, each committee deals with human rights within its respective sphere of 
competence. The Legal Affairs Committee maintains contact with, and discusses the annual reports of, the 
Danish Institute for Human rights and the Ombudsman.  The Parliament has no formal procedures for 
monitoring the implementation of ECtHR judgments and there is no system of executive reporting to 
                                                     
15
 Information supplied by the Parliamentary Institute, August 2015. 
16
 See Sub-Committee on Human Rights relative to Justice and Equality Matters, Orders of Reference (undated). 
17
 Orders of Reference available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/sub-Committee-on-HRRJEM-Orders-of-
Reference.pdf. 
18
 For more information see: Adam Bodnar and Dominika Bychawska-Siniarska, ‘Polish Parliament – Guarding Human 
Rights?’ Open Democracy, 3 March 2014; available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/adam-
bodnar-dominika-bychawska-siniarska/polish-parliament-guarding-human-rights; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
‘Parliamentary Subcommittee on Execution of European Court of Human Rights’ judgments established’, 6 February 
2014; available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/foreign_policy/human_rights/european_court_of_human_rights/news/parliamentary_
subcommittee_for_the_execution_of_the_european_court_of_human_rights__judgments_established_.   
19
 See http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/prezentare_subcomisie_cedo_engleza.pdf at p. 3. 
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Parliament on implementation.
20
   
 EXAMPLE: Netherlands  
In the Netherlands, no parliamentary committee has an explicit remit to scrutinise legislation for Convention 
compliance or to conduct oversight of the execution of ECtHR judgments. Nor is there a specialised human 
rights unit at the disposal of members of parliament. However, each house of Parliament (the House of 
Representatives and the Senate) has both a permanent Justice Committee and a legal service, which place 
emphasis on verifying legislation for compliance with the ECHR.  
 
Government Bills are accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, which identifies any issues of 
conformity with the ECHR or other international human rights standards. In addition, every Bill, before it is 
submitted to Parliament, must pass before the Council of State (a constitutionally-established advisory body 
to the Government) for an opinion on matters including human rights compliance, to which the Government 
in turn responds. This material informs subsequent legislative scrutiny by the relevant parliamentary 
committee(s). Parliamentarians may also seek advice from the Council of State or from civil servants within 
the Ministry of Justice, who receive training in human rights. The Government also reports annually to 
Parliament on the execution of judgments (see section 2.1). 
 
 EXAMPLE: Russia  
 
The State Duma has 30 committees, none of which deals specifically with human rights matters. Questions 
relating to Convention compliance and ECtHR judgments fall primarily, though not exclusively, within the 
remit of three Committees: on Civil, Criminal, Arbitration and Procedural Legislation; on Constitutional 
Legislation and State Building; and on Foreign Affairs. There is no institutionalised parliamentary mechanism 
to monitor the implementation of judgments. Since 2011, in accordance with a presidential decree, annual 
reports are prepared by the Ministry of Justice for the attention of the President, which include, among other 
things, a list of the laws which have had to be adopted or repealed by the Parliament in order to comply with 
judgments of the ECtHR.
21
 
 
 EXAMPLE: Sweden  
 
In the Swedish Parliament, legislative proposals are first examined by a commission of inquiry comprised of 
MPs from all parties represented in Parliament, as well as experts from governmental agencies and 
sometimes also judicial figures or academics.
22
 Commission reports are then opened up to public 
consultation. If the proposal is taken forward, the draft bill is submitted to Parliament for scrutiny by the 
permanent select committee responsible for the relevant subject matter. Permanent select committees mirror 
the structure of government departments, meaning that none has a specialised human rights remit.  The 
Parliament has no specific mechanism for monitoring the implementation of Court judgments, and becomes 
involved only if the Government considers that legislation is necessary to remedy a violation and introduces 
a bill via a commission of inquiry; parliamentary questions could also be asked about what action the 
executive was taking in response to a judgment. 
 
 
1.2.2 Hybrid models 
 
10. Hybrid models, which combine elements of both specialisation and mainstreaming, are common 
across States’ Parties to the ECHR. In such models, more than one parliamentary committee or sub-
committee has human rights within its mandate, which may or may not include specific functions such as 
monitoring the execution of ECtHR judgments.  
 EXAMPLE: Armenia  
Within the National Assembly of Armenia, the Committee on Human Rights and Public Affairs and the 
Committee on State and Legal Affairs each has human rights within its sphere of competence (although 
legislative vetting is a cross-cutting activity).
23
 Neither has a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of 
ECtHR judgments, and there is no requirement on Government to report regularly to Parliament. 
 EXAMPLE: Cyprus 
In the House of Representatives in Cyprus, two committees - the Standing Committee on Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunities for Men and Women, and the Committee on Legal Affairs - may each become involved 
                                                     
20
 Information provided by Mette Vestergaard, Secretariat of the Danish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly. 
21
 Presidential Decree on monitoring the application of law in the Russian Federation, No. 657), 20 May 2011 
22
 Thomas Bull and Iain Cameron, ‘Legislative Review for Human Rights Compatibility: A View from Sweden’ in Murray 
Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds) Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart 
Publishing, 2015): 279 
23
 Information provided by Arpine Hovhannisyan, member of the Committee of State and Legal Affairs.  
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in both legislative vetting and follow-up of ECtHR judgments. Both committees were involved, for example, in 
monitoring the implementation of the judgment in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, concerning (on the part of 
Cyprus) failures to protect a victim of human trafficking, Oxana Rantseva, and (on the part of both states) a 
failure adequately to investigate her death.
24
 
 
 EXAMPLE: Georgia      
 
The Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee (‘Human Rights Committee’) in the Georgian Parliament 
has ‘broad powers to monitor and evaluate the human rights situation in the country and the government‘s 
compliance with and respect for national laws and international agreements affecting human rights’.
25
  The 
Legal Issues Committee may also become involved occasionally when a draft law is required in response to 
a judgment, usually relating to criminal justice. There is, however, no system of monitoring the 
implementation of judgments, nor any obligation on the Government to report regularly to Parliament on the 
matter. The Human Rights Committee developed an Action Plan for 2015-16, which makes no reference to 
either the Convention or judgments of the Court.
26
   
 
 EXAMPLE: Germany 
The two committees of the Bundestag (the lower house) which primarily deal with human rights questions 
are the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, which has 18 members, and the Committee on 
Legal Affairs, which has 37 members. The Petitions Committee may also consider human rights matters in 
the course of its review of individual complaints concerning the public impact of legislation. 
The Committee on Legal Affairs leads on all matters relating to the Ministry of Justice. The Committee on 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid is rarely the lead committee on a particular issue, as it is not aligned 
with a specific ministry. Instead, it discusses human rights issues from a broad perspective – both on an 
international basis and in relation to Germany. Neither committee has an explicit agreed mandate to consider 
the implementation of European Court judgments; their involvement (or that of other parliamentary 
committees) will depend on the particular matter of law or policy raised by a judgment. Independent, expert 
advice is provided to MPs by the research service within Parliament, including on matters of international 
human rights law. 
Where new or revised legislation is required to implement a judgment, the issue will be considered by the 
Committee on Legal Affairs. In those circumstances it is common for the Committee to summon 
representatives of the Ministry of Justice to attend to explain why they consider it is necessary, and why the 
draft law is considered to be sufficient to implement the judgment. The Ministry of Justice reports annually to 
parliament on ECtHR judgments and their state of execution (see section 2.1).  
 EXAMPLE: Italy  
In the bicameral Italian Parliament, both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have Constitutional Affairs 
Committees, while the Senate also has an Extraordinary Commission for Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights.
27
 These three committees examine judgments of the ECtHR with the aim of evaluating and 
adopting necessary legislative reforms. The Committees also receive an annual report on judgments from 
the Prime Minister’s office (see also section 2.1). They are not, however, responsible for legislative vetting for 
compliance with the ECHR, which is a mainstreamed activity. 
 EXAMPLE: Lithuania  
The Lithuanian Parliament has two committees with an interest in human rights: the Committee on Human 
Rights
28
 and the Committee on Legal Affairs.
29
 Both Committees play an oversight role with respect to the 
implementation of ECtHR judgments. Once or twice a year, the Committees consider a report by the 
Lithuanian Government Agent on judgments against Lithuania and newly-communicated cases (see also 
section 2.1).  
 
 
1.3 Advantages and disadvantages of specialisation and mainstreaming  
 
11. There obviously exists no blueprint for the ideal configuration of parliamentary structures and 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance with ECHR standards and ECtHR judgments.  
                                                     
24
 No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010. Information provided by Eleni Georgiou, International Relations Officer of the House of 
Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus.  
25
 See http://www.parliament.ge/en/saparlamento-saqmianoba/komitetebi/adamianis-uflebata-dacvisa-da-samoqalaqo-
integraciis-komiteti/komitetis-shesaxeb. 
26
 Committee on Human Rights and Civil Integration of the Parliament of Georgia, Action Plan 2015-2016 (2014).   
27
 See https://www.senato.it/3723?shadow_organo=1170075. 
28
 See http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=6150&p_k=2. 
29
 See http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=6147&p_k=2. 
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12. The Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) has ventured to suggest that in a weak parliamentary 
system, characterised by strong party discipline and dominance by a single party, ‘mainstreaming human 
rights might have little effect’.
30
 Similarly, it adds, ‘tacking human rights on to the mandates of other standing 
committees runs the risk of thin commitment to, and insufficient time and resources for, implementation’. In 
states where the execution of judgments and the verification of legislation for human rights compatibility is 
poorly coordinated within the executive, there may be advantages to having a specialised human rights 
committee or sub-committee, which is independent of the executive and can, over time, develop both 
systematic oversight mechanisms and human rights expertise among its members and staff.  
 
13. In bicameral parliaments, if the decision is taken to have a specialised human rights committee, 
there appear to be merits in making it a joint committee of both houses in order to maximise the potential for 
both detailed scrutiny and political influence.  
14. Despite the potential advantages of having a specialised human rights committee or sub-committee, 
there is a risk that leaving human rights scrutiny to a single specialised body may create a ‘silo’ within 
parliament and discourage the integration of human rights and related rule of law issues into the work of 
other committees. Moreover, the mere existence of a specialised committee does not guarantee effective 
implementation; rather, the effectiveness of such structures is dependent upon factors such as political will 
and the availability of expert legal advice. For example, the Azerbaijani Parliament has a standing 
Committee on Human Rights yet there is scant evidence of effective oversight activity on its part in relation to 
Convention standards or ECtHR judgments.
31
    
15. Whatever the particular committee structure, it has often been underlined that it is important for 
parliamentarians have access to specialised secretariat support and politically-independent advice on human 
rights law. ECtHR judgments are very often a low priority for MPs who have many competing demands on 
their attention and may view judgments as politically unpalatable. It is to be expected that few 
parliamentarians have specialised human rights expertise – or the time to develop such expertise. The 
development of a professional parliamentary staff provides continuity between parliaments and ensures the 
creation of an ‘institutional memory’ attached to the work of parliamentary committees, both in relation to 
substantive issues and working methods. This is much less likely to occur where advisers are transient 
political appointees of either individual MPs or party groups. 
 
 
2. Reporting mechanisms 
 
2.1 Annual reports  
 
16. Where systematic reporting by the executive to parliament takes place, this usually consists of an 
annual report prepared either by the responsible ministry (usually Justice or Foreign Affairs) or by the 
Government Agent on adverse ECtHR judgments and the steps taken by the executive to execute them. 
 
17. Annual reports may be too infrequent to enable parliament to influence the executive response to 
judgments in ‘real time’; however, such reporting mechanisms appear to possess several significant 
advantages:   
(i) The anticipation of scrutiny can itself have a galvanising effect on executive bodies, which may act in 
order to pre-empt parliamentary or wider public criticism.  
(ii) Regular reporting mechanisms can prompt governments to streamline and systematise coordination 
within the executive branch, thereby increasing the efficiency of the execution process. Such a process can 
also highlight problems that occur, e.g. where the Government Agent (before the Court) appears to lacks the 
‘political status' required to influence or obtain information from other arms of the executive.  
(iii) In the medium- to long-term, regular executive reporting may have the beneficial effect of normalising the 
execution process and preventing it from becoming unduly politicised. 
18. As noted above, some form of reporting takes place in, among other states, the Czech Republic,  
Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Other examples are provided below: some are recent 
innovations (Croatia and Hungary) while others are longer-established (Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom). 
                                                     
30
  Open Society Justice Initiative, From Rights to Remedies: Structures and Strategies for Implementing 
International Human Rights Decisions (New York, Open Society Foundations, 2013), p. 68; available at: 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/from-rights-to-remedies-20130708.pdf. 
31
 Information provided by members of the Human Rights Legislation Division of the Parliament to the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s Parliamentary Project Support Division states that proposals on amending or 
revoking existing legislation or adopting new legal provisions in response ECtHR judgments are submitted 
directly to the Head of the Parliament Office. 
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 EXAMPLE: Croatia  
In 2013, the Government Agent was called upon by the Parliament of Croatia to submit a report concerning 
the issue of representing the Republic of Croatia in ECHR proceedings and on execution of ECHR 
judgements. The Parliament of Croatia received this report, the first of this kind, on 18 October 2013 and 
according to a new regulation, the Agent must report at least annually to the Croatian Government and to the 
Parliament. 
 EXAMPLE: Germany 
The German Ministry of Justice has reported on ECtHR judgments annually since 2004 to both the 
Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid and the Committee on Legal Affairs (see also section 
1.3).
32
 Initially, the report covered judgments and decisions against Germany. Since 2007, it has covered the 
implementation of judgments. Since 2010, a separate annual report has also been produced covering 
judgments against other states which have potential implications for Germany.  There is no formalised 
parliamentary procedure to respond to these reports.  Parliamentary committees may put it on to their 
agenda for discussion (although this is not done routinely) and they may summon government 
representatives for questioning.  
 EXAMPLE: Hungary 
The Government Agent reports annually on Hungarian cases and their implementation status to the Justice 
Committee (see also section 1.1). These reports are discussed in Committee meetings with the State 
Secretary of Ministry of Justice, in the presence of the press and representatives of non-governmental 
organisations. 
 EXAMPLE: Netherlands  
In the Netherlands, a Government report on adverse judgments was initiated in 1996 at the request of the 
House of Representatives.
33
 Since 2006, it has included information on the implementation of judgments and 
since 2009 it has included information about judgments against third countries which have immediate 
implications for Dutch law or policy. Since 2010, it has included updates about reasoned inadmissibility 
decisions by the ECHR in Dutch cases. The 2013 report has a broader remit, covering all international 
human rights proceedings concerning the Netherlands, including the European Committee for Social Rights 
and United Nations treaty bodies. 
 EXAMPLE: United Kingdom  
In 2011, the Government initiated the production of an annual report on responding to human rights 
judgments, as had been requested by the Joint Committee on Human Rights since 2008.
34
 In relation to the 
ECHR, the report includes sections on the UK’s general approach to the implementation of Strasbourg 
decisions and updates on the execution of specific judgments.   
 
2.2 Action plans and action reports 
19. An action plan sets out the measures which a state intends to take to implement a judgment of the 
Court. An action report describes the measures which have been taken by a state to implement a judgment 
and/or explains why a state considers that no measures (or no further measures) are necessary. Action 
plans/reports were introduced by the Committee of Ministers in 2004 and have become embedded in the 
supervision process since 2009. Under both the standard and enhanced supervision procedures of the 
Committee of Ministers, states are required to submit an action plan or report on the case at the latest within 
six months from the date upon which the judgment became final.  
20. Once submitted to the Committee of Ministers, action plans/reports are public documents. Moreover, 
they should be considered as working documents which may need to revised or updated as required.    
21. It has been suggested that regular parliamentary scrutiny of action plans/reports would not only 
facilitate retrospective monitoring of executive action but would also have the additional advantage of 
galvanising executives to improve the quality and timeliness of action plans/reports from the outset. Although 
                                                     
32
 See, e.g., Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, Bericht über die Rechtsprechung des 
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte und die Umsetzung seiner Urteile in Verfahren gegen die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahr 2013, 6 June 2014; available at 
http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/20140814_EGMR-
Rechtssprechungsbericht%202013%20(gegen%20Deutschland).pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
33
 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs (International Law Division) Rapportage 2013:  Internationale 
Mensenrechtenprocedures (2014); available at: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/rapporten/2014/04/24/rapportage-2013-internationale-mensenrechtenprocedures.html. 
34
 For the latest, see Ministry of Justice, Responding to Human Rights Judgments: Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government Response to Human Rights Judgments 2013-14, CM 8962 (2014); available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389272/responding-to-human-rights-
judgments-2013-2014.pdf.  
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the Committee of Ministers has since 2011 published all action plans/reports on its website, this does not 
always happen immediately or in a way which makes action plans easily accessible. Of interest to note, in 
this connection, is the idea that parliamentary committees should press executive bodies to send action 
plans or reports to them at the same time as they are submitted to the Committee of Minsters, in order that 
parliamentary staff may review them and selectively draw MPs’ attention to action plans or reports which 
merit greater scrutiny, as happens in the UK.   
 
 
3. Principles underpinning the parliamentary role in ensuring human rights compliance  
22. Whatever the specific committee structures adopted by national parliaments, certain principles 
underpin their role in ensuring compliance with international (as well as domestic) human rights standards. 
These principles pertain to the status, functions and powers of parliamentary bodies. Cross reference can, in 
this connection, be made to issues and priorities identified by the Parliamentary Assembly (see especially for 
Resolution 1823 (2011), appended to this memorandum), as well as international organisations such as the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union.
35
   
23. For brevity, the term ‘committee,’ in this section, refers to any committee or sub-committee that 
regularly considers human rights matters, whether as a specialised function or as part of a broader mandate.   
 Does the committee have a permanent status? 
 Is the remit of the committee clearly defined and enshrined in the parliament’s standing orders (or 
equivalent)?  
 Is the remit of the committee sufficiently broad so as to reflect the imperative for parliament both to 
protect and realise human rights in the state concerned? 
 Does the remit of the committee expressly include, or could it be interpreted by its members to 
include:  
o systematic verification of the compatibility of draft legislation with international human rights 
obligations;  
o systematic monitoring of the implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights, including the requirement for governments to regularly submit reports on human rights 
judgments and their implementation; 
o the power to initiate legislative proposals and amendments to laws; and 
o subpoena powers over witnesses and documents relevant to its remit?  
 Does the committee have access to independent advisers with expertise in human rights law? 
 Is the committee adequately resourced to carry out its functions, included dedicated secretariat 
support? 
 Does the method of appointment of the committee ensure that it is independent from the executive? 
 Does the membership of the committee reflect the principle of political pluralism, i.e. does it reflect 
the balance of power between political groups within the Parliament?  
 Does the committee maintain regular dialogue with other bodies, at national level (e.g. national 
human rights institutions or ombudsmen)
36
 and international level (e.g. Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, European and other international human rights 
monitoring bodies)? 
 Does the committee regularly invite non-governmental organisations to contribute to its work, e.g. by 
submitting evidence to thematic inquiries, assisting the committee to determine priorities for its 
inquiries, or providing evidence about the impact of legislation on the enjoyment of human rights?   
 
                                                     
35
 Inter-Parliamentary Union and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights 
Handbook for Parliamentarians (IPU and OHCHR: Geneva, 2005).    
36
 See Belgrade Principles on the relationship between national human rights institutions and parliaments, February 
2012: http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/Themes/Portuguese/DocumentsPage/Belgrade%20Principles%20Final.pdf. 
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4. National implementation laws 
24. Parliaments may contribute to the implementation of human rights standards by passing legislation 
which enshrines the authorities and duties of all national actors with responsibility for ensuring human rights 
compliance. Such legislation may also clarify how regional and international human rights conventions 
should be applied within the domestic legal order. 
25. The mere existence of a legislative framework does not, necessarily, guarantee smooth 
implementation of Strasbourg Court judgments: see, in this connection, the situation with respect to Italy and 
Ukraine.
37
  
26. That said, as OSJI notes, formal regulation of the implementation process may bring several 
advantages.
38
 For example, it may: 
 enshrine the role of parliament in the execution process, e.g. by ensuring timely and 
systematic reporting on the implementation of judgments by the executive to parliament (see 
section 3);  
 stipulate timeframes within which judgments are to be implemented;  
 simplify complex or contradictory administrative procedures; 
 ensure that the Government Agent has the necessary power and authority to acquire 
relevant information; liaise with those responsible at the national level for deciding on the 
measures required to execute a judgment; and, if required, take necessary measures to 
accelerate the execution process;
39
 and  
 ensure that domestic processes for ensuring Convention-compliance are not vulnerable to 
changes from one administration to the next. 
 
 EXAMPLE: Italy  
Italy passed an implementation law (the ‘Azzolini law’) in 2006, which defines the relationship between the 
main domestic actors involved in executing ECtHR judgments.
40
 Among other things, the law enumerates 
the duties of the Prime Minister for communicating judgments in a timely fashion to Parliament and reporting 
annually to parliament on the state of implementation.   
 EXAMPLE: ‘The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’  
In ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, two parliamentary committees have a human rights-related 
remit: the Committee on Political System and Inter-Ethnic Relations and the Standing Inquiry Committee on 
Protection of Civil Freedoms and Rights.  In 2009, a Law on Enforcement of ECtHR Judgments was adopted 
(which was amended in 2014). This followed a review which had revealed that the state lacked a defined 
process for executing judgments. Under the law, an Inter Departmental Commission (comprised of senior 
officials in all relevant ministries; the Presidents of the Judicial Council and the Public Prosecutors’ Council; 
the Ombudsman; and the Government Agent) was established. The Commission drafts analyses of ECtHR 
judgments; recommends individual and general measures to remedy the violation(s); proposes legislative 
reform; and monitors the enforcement of the Court’s judgments. The Commission is obliged to report 
annually to the Standing Inquiry Committee on Civil Freedoms and Rights in the Assembly. 
 EXAMPLE: Ukraine  
In 2006, Ukraine introduced a law imposing specific obligations on state actors after a judgment of the 
ECtHR against Ukraine has become final.
41
  Among other provisions, within ten days, the Government Agent 
is required to summarise the judgment for publication in an official newspaper.  The Agent must also 
disseminate translated summaries of judgments against Ukraine to the Ombudsman (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Human Rights) and to state bodies, officials and others directly affected.  The Agent must 
send a quarterly ‘motion on general measures’ to the Cabinet of Ministers. The 2006 Law requires 
administrative acts to be adopted and relevant draft laws to be submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers to 
                                                     
37
 At the end of 2014, there were just under 11,000 judgments pending before the Committee of Ministers. Italy 
accounted for 2,622 of them and Ukraine accounted for 1,009. See 8
th
 Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers 
2014, pp.36-37; available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM_annreport2014_en.pdf  
A leading case is one that reveals a new structural or systemic problem in a respondent State, and which therefore 
requires the adoption of general measures to remedy the violation. 
38
 Open Society Justice Initiative, Rights to Remedies, pp. 59-61.  
39
 As required by Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)2 at para. 1. 
40
 Law No. 12/2006 (Italian Official Bulletin No 15, 10 January 2006).  
41
 Law on the Enforcement of Judgments and the Application of the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights 
Judgments 2006, Law No 3477-IV of 23 February 2006. Certain, largely technical amendments were made under Law 
No 3135-VI (2011). For an unofficial English translation of the 2006 law, see OSJI, Rights to Remedies at Appendix II, 
pp. 171-179. Appendix II also contains unofficial translations of comparable laws from Peru and Colombia.  
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Ukraine’s unicameral Parliament within three months of the Prime Minister’s instruction to the relevant 
ministries. 
 
 
5. Opportunities for strengthening the parliamentary role 
27. In summary, this memorandum has provided an overview of various ways in which parliaments may 
- and in several instance have been able to - strengthen their role in helping states comply with Convention 
standards and, when need arises, Strasbourg Court judgments.  Issues which may merit further reflection 
include steps that may be taken to:  
 ensure that parliamentary structures exist with the appropriate remit and powers to verify legislation 
for compliance with the ECHR and conduct effective oversight of the implementation of ECtHR 
judgments; this may include a specific law on implementation;   
 press for executive bodies to report regularly (and at least annually) on adverse judgments of the 
ECtHR and their state of execution; 
 press for executive bodies to send action plans or reports at the same time as they are submitted to 
the Committee of Ministers; parliamentary staff could, in turn, scrutinise these action plans and 
highlight  inadequacies to parliamentarians; 
 use existing powers to exercise human rights scrutiny; for example, the power to question ministers, 
hold hearings or initiate amendments to draft laws;  
 maintain regular dialogue with other human rights-related institutions such as national human rights 
institutions and ombudsmen, as well as with civil society organisations; and 
 ensure that members of delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly are called upon to promote 
awareness and application of Convention standards, and that their work is coordinated with that of 
the relevant parliamentary committee(s). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Resolution 1823 (2011)42 
Adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 23 June 2011 
 
National parliaments: guarantors of human rights in Europe 
 
1. The Parliamentary Assembly recalls that Council of Europe member states are responsible for the 
effective implementation of international human rights norms they have signed up to, in particular those of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, hereafter “the Convention”). This obligation 
concerns all state organs, whether executive, judicial or legislative. 
2. National parliaments are often overlooked in this context. Their potential needs to be further explored. 
They are key to the effective implementation of international human rights norms at national level and fulfil 
their duty to protect human rights through legislating (including the vetting of draft legislation), involvement in 
the ratification of international human rights treaties, holding the executive to account, liaising with national 
human rights institutions and fostering the creation of a pervasive human rights culture. 
3. The members of the Assembly, having a double mandate – as members of the Assembly and of their 
respective national parliaments – are under a particular duty to contribute to such action. 
4. The Assembly notes that the United Nations “Paris Principles” of 1993 have become the internationally 
accepted benchmark for core minimum standards for the role and functioning of independent national human 
rights institutions; similar benchmarks should be drawn up for parliamentary bodies. 
5. With respect to the implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the 
Court”), the Assembly: 
 5.1. believes that national parliaments are uniquely placed to hold governments to account for swift 
and effective implementation of the Court’s judgments, as well as to swiftly adopt the necessary legislative 
amendments; 
 5.2. regrets that the post-Interlaken debate on the future of the Convention system does not 
sufficiently take into account the potentially important role of parliaments and deplores the silence of the 
Izmir Declaration in this respect; 
 5.3. points to the positive examples in several member states, notably the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Romania, which have set up parliamentary structures to monitor the 
implementation of the Court’s judgments. 
6. Furthermore, the Assembly:  
 6.1. encourages parliamentarians to monitor the determination and enforcement of human rights 
standards by the domestic judicial and administrative authorities; 
 6.2. urges parliamentarians to exercise their responsibility to carefully scrutinise the executive in their 
countries when it comes to the implementation of, in particular, international human rights norms;  
 6.3. calls on governments to involve national parliaments in the negotiation process of international 
human rights agreements and in the process of implementation of judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights; 
 6.4. calls on all member states to provide for adequate parliamentary procedures to systematically 
verify the compatibility of draft legislation with Convention standards and avoid future violations of the 
Convention, including regular monitoring of all judgments which could potentially affect the respective legal 
orders; 
 6.5. urges parliaments to step up their efforts in contributing to the supervision of the Court’s 
judgments by overseeing steps taken by the competent authorities to execute adverse judgments, including 
scrutiny of the actual measures taken; 
 6.6. calls on parliaments to set up and/or to reinforce structures that would permit the mainstreaming 
and rigorous supervision of their international human rights obligations, on the basis of the principles below. 
                                                     
42
 Assembly debate on 23 June 2011 (25th Sitting) (see Doc. 12636, report of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Pourgourides). Text adopted by the Assembly on 23 June 2011 
(25th Sitting). 
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7. The Assembly therefore invites parliaments to implement the following basic principles for parliamentary 
supervision of international human rights standards. 
 
Appendix - Basic principles for parliamentary supervision of international human rights standards 
1. Appropriate framework and responsibilities  
National parliaments shall establish appropriate parliamentary structures to ensure rigorous and regular 
monitoring of compliance with and supervision of international human rights obligations, such as dedicated 
human rights committees or appropriate analogous structures, whose remits shall be clearly defined and 
enshrined in law.  
These remits should include, inter alia: 
– the systematic verification of the compatibility of draft legislation with international human rights 
obligations; 
– the requirement for governments to regularly submit reports on relevant judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights and their implementation; 
– the initiation of legislative proposals and amendments to laws; 
– subpoena powers over witnesses and documents concerning their remit. 
Such committees shall have the responsibility to ensure that parliaments are properly advised and informed 
on human rights issues. Human rights training should also be provided for parliamentarians and their staff. 
2. Independent advice 
Human rights committees or appropriate analogous structures shall have access to independent expertise in 
human rights law.  
Adequate resources shall also be made available to provide specialised secretariat support. 
3. Co-operation with other institutions and civil society 
Co-operation and regular dialogue shall be maintained, as appropriate, with relevant national (for example, 
national human rights institutions, parliamentary commissioners) and international bodies (for example, the 
Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, European and other 
international human rights monitoring bodies), as well as with representatives of well-established non-
governmental organisations which have significant and relevant experience. 
